AFRICA AND THE THREATS TO ITS SECURITY

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Introduction

Analyzing Africa is always appealing, but also very complex, since that there is not only one Africa, but several Africas, as political regimes and systems, cultures, languages, religions, socio-economic situations, resources, integration and even the security situation. When we talk specifically about security threats in this huge space, we are immediately confronted with several questions such as: What are these threats? Where do they come from? How do they manifest? Thus, the purpose of this essay is to reflect on what we consider to be the main security threats on the African continent.

First, we need to make clear what is meant by threats in the contemporary strategic context, knowing that they reflect numerous political, economic and social changes that have occurred in the world since the end of the last century.

Traditionally, threat is defined as any event or action (ongoing or foreseeable), of varying nature and arising from a conscious will that is contrary to the attainment of an objective that normally causes damage, material or moral; at bottom, the product of a possibility for an intention (Couto 1998).

However, today, since this concept is not comprehensive enough, it tends to present difficult problems when we try to specify its nature; furthermore, it does not allow the inclusion of some manifestations with such serious implications that they can be classified as non-traditional threats to security, as climate change or pandemics such as AIDS.

Since the variety of concepts on the subject, in this essay we chose to adopt the definition of transnational threat from the United Nations report, *More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, which admits a rather broad

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conception of threat, viewed as: "(...) Any event or process that leads to large-scale death or lessening of life chances and undermines States as the basic unit of the international system is a threat to international security (...)" (NU, 2004).

In broad terms, we can consider security as the pursuit of liberation from the threat, resulting from the interaction between the vulnerabilities of a political unit and the threats it faces (Waever et. Al. 1993). But this contested, ambiguous, complex concept with strong political and ideological implications has also changed.

Currently, the trend is to broaden the concept and include other dimensions such as economic security, ecosystem security and other alternative security concepts, including international organized crime, the transnational spread of disease, large-scale international migratory movements, societal security (Buzan, 1991) and human security (UNDP 1994).

Also, it is important to remember that the relationship between security and development is undeniable nowadays, and there can be no development without peace or security, and without development and prosperity, there will be no conditions for the maintenance of lasting peace. In this context, the approach to the safety dimension should not be seen as a goal itself, but as a fundamental concern, namely for preemptive or preventive action on the causes of fragility and instability.

In this order of ideas, in our brief essay, we begin by addressing the security context in Africa, the structural violence that manifests itself across the Continent, and then we address what seems to be, for us, the main threats that manifest themselves in that very different space. Amongst them, we highlight the one in the present context that, for us, seems to be the greatest threat, the failure of the state that can and should be related to the other threats. Although the state fails, the populations continue to live in these spaces, having different forms of social organization that subsist and compete with the other state structures in collecting taxes, using force and social responsibility over the populations they control.

The second threat that we emphasize in our essay is the one linked to those social structures that try to impose themselves in several geographic spaces, global subversion; and at a more superfitial level, we address other security threats in Africa, whether natural, such as climate change and pandemics, or caused by human action, such as organized crime and piracy.

The African security context

The African continent, with its approximately 30.2 million km² spread across 54 states, had been the stage, for the last half century, of permanent structural violence. In 2017, according to the Conflict Barometer, published by the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, it still maintains high levels of violence: 13 high-level conflicts, including ten wars and three limited wars in countries as diverse as Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, the Central African Republic, Nigeria, Somalia, Libya and South Sudan (HIICR 2017).

On the Continent, the region most affected by severe violent conflicts is sub-Saharan Africa, in which in 2007 78 conflicts were reported, from a total of 328 conflicts. Of these, two are on the highest scale (from 0 to 5), considered as war, and the remaining seven considered as severe crisis (level 4). In the same year, 24 crises (level 3) and 45 non-violent conflicts (levels 1 and 2) were reported (HIICR 2007).

In 2017, the Heidelberg Institute kept its analysis at five levels, calculated in the same way, but modifying the terminology. If we consider the sub-national analysis, there were 17 more conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa than in 2007 (95 in total), accounting for ten wars (level 5), three limited wars (level 4), 48 violent crises (level 3), and 32 nonviolent conflicts (levels 1 and 2). In 2017, a new war broke out in the border region of Ethiopia with Somalia and three limited wars escalated to war, one in the Central African Republic (Anti-Balaka - former Séléka), which this year caused 1.1 million displaced people. ; and two new wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Kasai and South Kivu Regions), a country where more than a hundred armed groups seeking local supremacy and access to natural resources can be counted in the East alone; here displaced persons accounted for 1.7 million people. On the other hand, this year, the war in Sudan between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) and the government (SPLM/A) dropped significantly in intensity to level 3 crisis. violent (HIICR 2017).

This conflict has diverse roots, but in general we can consider that it is essentially due to the failure of states as the basic unit of the international political system.

The failure of the state in Africa

When it comes to the failure or fragility of the state - or any of the various terms that have been popularized when evaluating a state's perfor-

mance - there is a more or less explicit reference to its constituent elements: its territory, its people and its sovereign political power. In the expression of this sovereignty, it is up to the State to guarantee the pursuit of its ends, that is, the supply of the political goods contained in the founding social contract: security, justice and social welfare, to which we add the exercise of political activity, that is, governing. Of course, in the absence of a written social contract signed by the parties, the expected political goods vary according to time, space and even the dominant ideology.

Jean Bodin's definition is classical, defining the state as an entity that cannot be compared to others regarding internal order, in which it reigns supreme, and that does not recognize any other superior entity in the external order, and therefore is independent. This means that the state decides for itself how it will face its internal and external problems, including whether or not to seek the assistance of others and, in so doing, to limit its freedom by compromising with them (Waltz 2002).

However, not all political units can guarantee their inhabitants such political goods. Only with pragmatic purposes of demographically mapping what we are talking about through analysis of indexes such as the 2018 Fund For Peace Failed State Index, we easily realize that about a third of the world's population lives in areas considered critical or at risk. Several examples can be pointed out, the most significant ones in some regions of the African continent: out of the 54 African countries, four are in the "very high alert" category (South Sudan, Somalia, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo), four in the "high alert" category (Sudan, Chad, Zimbabwe and Guinea-Conakry), seventeen in the "alert" category and the rest appear as "very high warning" or "high warning" except Namibia, Botswana and Ghana, which appear in the warning ranking (Fund For Peace 2018).

There are several concepts that appear to us associated with an attempt to define state failure, as well as various classification criteria, and we identify terminologies as weak states (Fukuyama 2006)[2], failed states, or even collapsed states, in Rotberg interpretations (2004)[3] and Zartman (1995)[4]. Thus

2 Fukuyama classifies the term "weak," referring to the strength of the state rather than its scope, meaning "(...) a lack of institutional capacity to implement and enforce policies, often induced by an underlying lack of legitimacy of the political system as one all" (Fukuyama 2006).

3 This author differentiates failed states from collapsed states. A state fails as a result of "internal violence, the government loses credibility (....) making it illegitimate to its population." A collapsed state corresponds to "an extreme version of a failed state" in which security is guaranteed by the law of the fittest and where "there is a vacuum of authority" in which "warlords or non-state actors acquire the region control " (Rotberg 2004).

4 For Zartman, collapsed states are those whose "basic state functions are no longer performed." (Zartman 1995).

we have a portrait that presents different degrees of state degeneration.

Despite this analytical inaccuracy or ambiguous definition, these concepts help us identify Political Units where bad governance prevails (endemic corruption, abuse of power, disrespect for human dignity, institutional weakness), social deregulation, lack of infrastructure and public services, the inability to enforce the rule of law or to end internal conflict. In addition to these endogenous phenomena, there are a number of factors exogenous to the state itself that push it into situations of fragility and eventually collapse.

Thus, the concepts associated with the failure of the state are concepts opposed to the reference of what can be defined as a successful state. Starting from a pragmatic empiricism, failed states are entities "that are unable or unwilling to guarantee the minimum conditions for their populations: internal peace, law and order, and good governance" (Rotberg 2004). These are states where "the government is losing physical control over its territory or where it has no monopoly on the legitimate use of force" (Foreign Policy 2009). The failed state is considered, "ultimately unable to support itself as a member of the international community" (Helman and Ratner 1993) and relies on regular flows of external assistance. In Africa these concepts portray states as "lacking the sovereign capacity needed for the effective exercise of power and authority" (Nwozor 2018).

On the African continent the failure of states is still closely linked to the inefficient management of opportunities by post-independence leaders. These leaders were unable to fully understand the role of the state and later were sustained by an authoritarian political class, with few scruples (Nwozor 2018) and holder of a patrimonial view of the State.

However, these are not accepted concepts and are prone to contestation. Charles Call considers that while the concept has acted "to correct prevailing approaches to promoting peace, development or humanitarian assistance" (Call 2008), today, according to that author, this is a fallacious and unhelpful concept due to the fact that it has given us a vision of the world defined by diplomatic and security agencies, especially in the post-September 11 period. Thus, this concept should be abandoned, and efforts should be made to identify alternative concepts of analysis that will be denotatively and connotatively clear, useful and discriminatory (Call 2008).

The concept of fragile state still continues to mirror a view of external actors on the importance of state building and how it should be conceptualized and operationalized. More than the vagueness of some indicators, the most striking criticism of the weak state literature has to do with the lack of a local reading of problems and solutions, that is, a difficulty in accepting that in these processes there must be local appropriation.

In this order of ideas, in recent years this language has been progressively replaced by references to varying degrees of deteriorated governance, state fragility. This view is preferred by development theorists who see in the language of failure a negative charge that politically undermines relations with these units of power. Here, in this essay, language has no denotations or pejorative connotations; it merely translates a methodological approach, more empirical than theorist or doctrinal, of phenomena that constitute threats to regional and global peace and security, and especially to their citizens: states that fail or are on the brink of failure (Garcia and Ferro 2013).

Social structures underlying the failure of the state and its typologies

The fact that states have various stages of weakness or have even collapsed - giving rise to volatile and undefined chaos, where incomplete alternative forms to previous sovereignty, multiple and conflicting forms, leading to endless wars, and growing exponentially throughout the African continent - does not prevent populations, for whom war is already a way of life, from continuing to inhabit these spaces and developing their activities. These activities range from subsistence, education and economy, through justice/law and order by the use of force, the collection of taxes and even the minting of money, developing actions that contribute to the exhaustion of existing or underlying formal power. Therefore, they represent several means of subversion.

The remaining forms of social organization can be typified as lumpen movements, ethnolinguistic associations, political/popular organizations and, finally, the most advanced subversive organizational form, global subversion (Garcia, 2010).

Lumpen movements are armed groups, slightly organized, with an informal and horizontal structure that can emerge and succeed against a weak state. Its energy radiates from the street rather than from the intellectual development of an ideology, and military action precedes the conceptualization of motives rather than emerging from them. The discipline is based on extreme brutality, with abundant use of narcotic drugs and alcoholic beverages. The support of the population emerges as a mere matter of survival, since the elements of the lumpen units systematically attack and exploit the populations, not having any kind of social responsibility on these. Belonging to the group is primarily a matter of survival, with forced recruitment (Garcia 2010). Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front is an example.

The ethnolinguistic basis for social organization arises in places such

as Somalia and throughout the Sahel Tuareg. Here, loyalties are based on genealogy and belonging is not an option, gaining social responsibility over the populations that belong to or identify with the group. Organization is defined by the family ties of structures that can be mobilized for conflict in primitive military units and are capable of small actions, but not sustained combat; They are very similar in their actions to the Lumpen forces, fighting above all for access to resources and, increasingly, from a perspective of enrichment. Their Forces are the manifestation of their culture and have little trace of doctrine of insurrection or staff organization, and leadership is indicated by the members, from whom comes the peer ascendant and the good acceptance by the elders from which they depend on for fundraising and recruitment (Mackinlay 2002).

The Popular Forces are different from the Lumpen and the ethnolinguistic forces due to their more elaborate political ideology and the proximity of the populations that support this ideology, tending towards a more consolidated military organization. In their traditional development, we can say that they have a pre-insurrectional and an insurrectional period. They come from a secret organization that can evolve and conduct extended operations over time. Their structure is based on cells and they tend to acquire an autonomous political component in relation to the military component. Examples are the secessionist movements: the Casamance Democratic Forces Movement in Senegal, the Cabinda Enclave Liberation Front in Angola, or the Biafra Sovereign State Update Movement in Nigeria.

Finally, we can mention the global subversion that plagues the entire Mediterranean area from Africa, from Algeria to Egypt, with Libya (a space that we can no longer considered a state with recognized authority throughout the territory) and the entire Sahel, spreading to more southern African countries, such as Nigeria, where Boko-Haram is based.

The global subversion

The global jihadist movement and its two main factions - al-Qaeda and the so-called Islamic State/Daesh – are a complex mixture of political-religious considerations and, through programmatic action, it seeks to modify the current International Order. Their ultimate goal is to recreate the Caliphate in the heart of the Islamic world, governed by a Sharia conceived from an integralist interpretation of the Koran. Thus, it seeks to transform Muslim society by clearing it from doctrinal innovation (Zuhur 2005), and extending Jihad to the secular countries of the region and subsequently replacing its leaders. Deep down, it seeks power and to take over states (Garcia 2010).

Their action and expansion will determine a substantial change in the status quo, hence our classification of them as global subversion.

In order to achieve its goals of conquering space and power, the use not only political power but also allow the use of violent mechanisms, and various methods are employed, including terror and conventional and irregular military tactics.

Its manifestation in several places is just a simple example of what is already ingrained from the Philippines to Nigeria, through China, Afghanistan and Libya, among many other countries and regions. This phenomenon, like the other subversive typologies, can be analyzed from various perspectives. However, this is the point in which Western interpretatuons fail: regarding perceptions. As a rule, and according to Zuhur (Zuhur 2005), we tend to interpret their mindsets as being different of ours. Bu, the core issue, lies on the difference of values and mechanisms of association. At heart, the new Jihad fighters are self-convinced that their immoral acts of violence are moral. In no way they defy the modern pattern logic of their mindset.

What is curious about this attitude, that establishes that Westerners are the enemy and that "for Western structural violence only global terrorism is the effective answer" (Moreira 2004), is that it is accepted by significant layers of the population, in contrast to the understanding of power, as is the case with Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, or in countries that are struggling with Islamist secessionist movements, such as Russia, China, Indonesia or Bangladesh.

These two armed organizations (al-Qaeda and Daesh) have global structures, intentions, objectives, funding and recruitment, and are supported by broad populations that share the same ideology or religion. Today, when their disagreements rely mostly on leadership (Guranatna 2017), they fight for loyalties, resources, funding and recruitment (Stern and Berger 2015).

Global subversion has a structure that manifests itself in countless ways and in various spaces. We may consider a first manifestation in central physical and geographical space; another in a decentralized and peripheral physical space; another in an ideological space (Duarte 2015); and transverse to these three, it manifests itself as a "force multiplier" in cyberspace.

The first central space, with territorial control, is located in large areas in the AfPak region (Afghanistan and Pakistan), and in Iraq and Syria. The genesis of the movement is here, and its command is centralized, manages territory, has social responsibility over the populations it controls, exercises law and order, collects taxes and employs "force" in an organized manner,

being able to perform "conventional" operations in a large scale[5].

The second space is based on its international spillover, by means of a complex and flexible transnational scale free network structure that encompasses several jihadist, associated and affiliated groups, with regional agendas, supporting the radical groups mutually, and finding existence of an active solidarity network extending from Chechnya to Sudan, through the Philippines, Somalia, Malaysia and Indonesia, as well as Europe, where it has very high interoperability in areas such as fundraising, recruitment and the acquisition of non-lethal material (Guranatna 2017). These affiliated structures have no direct subordination of central space (Duarte, 2015) and are largely self-sufficient in terms of armament and financing (Stern; Berger, 2015).

The third structural space is essentially based on an inspiring, unrelated, ideological dimension in which its elements act through an operational mimicry in the name of al-Qaeda or Daesh, such as the lone wolves, who anticipating their desires from central space through their speeches, ideology and action, have the initiative to plan their attacks in accordance with local conditions and capabilities, usually attacks of low financial cost but with great media impact.

Finally, the use of cyberspace, a battle space for internal and external communication but, above all, for, through a strategy applied to social networks as aggressively as military tactics, to extend its influence to the whole world. (Stern and Berger, 2015), trying to manage the perceptions of the populations controlled by them and the international community.

This structure seems to be evolving towards greater decentralization, demonstrating a global capacity to act, even attacking the heart of great powers, as it did in Brussels, Nice and Paris, managing to survive intense countermeasures. Their ability to survive comes from our view, above all from their capacity for transformation, which has allowed them to grow and surprise more and more.

In Europe and North America, those tentative "organizations" that exhibit malleability, plasticity, and opportunism in their connections always make coherent but above all convenient alliances, seeking to infiltrate through illegal emigration, and then to establish links with various Islamic nationalist organizations, with radical ethnic groups and multinational entities, drawing their appeal to the same common cause - cause capable of transcending differences (political, national and religious) - while maintaining their capacity to access considerable resources.

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5 The DAESH has seized much US military equipment provided to the Iraqi army, estimated at $ 25 billion. In (Sterna; Berger, 2015).

Recruitment sources and motives for adhering to jihadist radicalism are diverse and are mainly associated with revolt with degrading social situations, humiliating cultural factors, injustice, inequality and xenophobia, but also, according to Zuhur (2004), extremists recruit for a recent belief in the Islamic mission, *da'wa*, and in the glorification of Jihad and martyrdom, along with a desire to be able to contribute to the changing environment around them and the world at large.

Added to all these motivations, there is the exponential demographic growth and the migratory factor, with the flow predominantly oriented towards the countries of the West, where the new communities that settle, multiply the formation of inner colonies (Moreira 2004) in relation to which they are scarce instruments of integration in local societies, enhancing the growth of disenchanted and potential affiliates and combatants by the alternative presented by terrorism.

The "message" conveyed promotes a sense of inclusion, belonging and purpose (Stern; Berger 2015), being, in essence, a creator of identity and, at the same time, a guarantor of action, generating the possibility of "facing the factual condition, to be the most rational choice possible. If we add to this the media spread, namely via the Internet, participation in these movements is open to everyone, and collective action will tend to globalize" (Duarte 2015).

The use of social networks, mainly twitter, facebook and youtube, as well as the control of online edited forums and magazines, of which we highlight *Rumiyah* and al *Fatihin*, which play a crucial role in spreading the "message", contribute decisively to overall recruitment.

By considering the issue of communication as essential, these movements explore "the symbiotic relationship between media and violence, the best way to publicize and popularize a particular notion of Islamic resistance. Moreover, they emerge globally as the only catalyst for providential social and political change" (Duarte 2015). Daesh's propaganda and message spread in a number of languages, disproportionately hangs on the side of foreign fighters, both in terms of content and audience.

The statement, at the beginning of Ramadan in late June 2014, that Emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was the new Caliph Ibrahim had wide resonance among Muslims around the world, especially among Salafi jihadists. This announcement demanded the loyalty of all Muslims, especially all other jihadist groups (Stern; Berger 2015), and to whom swearing allegiance is given the prerogative of *wilayat* (status of future provinces).

As a consequence, global subversion, which had bin Laden as a visible face until his death, is now taking on its most significant form in the *Daesh*,

which, despite some loss of physical control in central space, seems likely to refocus efforts to consolidate distant wilayats as strongholds of power (Guranatna 2017) eventually expand to more southern places, as there is already strong evidence in the Cabo Delgado region of Mozambique, or even find sanctuaries in quieter places such as Cape Verde and at the same time, grow in cyberspace.

According to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, in 2017 violent actions linked to Islamic militant groups operating in Africa increased by 36% over the previous year (2,933 against 2,117), causing about 10,000 deaths (about 2,000 in Iraq). and in Syria). Also, the number of Jihadist fighters on the Continent now exceeds the number of fighters in Syria and Iraq; Only the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) in Nigeria has about 3,500 combatants (Africa Center For Strategic Studies, 2018).

Still according to this Institute, although the activity has grown, the main groups remain geographically concentrated (Somalia, Lake Chad Basin and central Mali), which shows several distinct local factors, different contexts, not presenting as a single threat; monolithic. In the Sahel region, destabilization affects countries with the highest population growth. The main motive for its growth seems to be associated with poor governance, state failure, demographic pressure and climate change.

The international community has sought to support local governments in addressing this threat, either with direct military intervention from countries such as France (Operation Barkhane) or the United States (AFRICOM), which have 4,500 men and 6,000 men in the region respectively. either with United Nations peace operations across the Continent, or Security Sector Reform operations promoted by the European Union. However, despite international support for military maneuver and development aid, primary responsibilities should be local, with a good example being military operations carried out by national armies with international support.

Global subversion cannot be analyzed in isolation and we must realize that threats today are multidimensional because they bring together more than one threat in the same situation.

Fig. 1 - Active Islamic groups. Africa Center For Strategic Studies (2018); in https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Africas-Active-Militant-Islamist-Groups-April-2018.pdf

The other security threats in Africa

The weakness of the state and chaos zones can and should be related to other threats, since, having no power or control over their entire territory, the states are permeable to germinate and develop in the most diverse ways. of subversion (Garcia and Ferro 2013). This combination may further undermine the already fragile existence of these countries as a political reality.

There are numerous regional and conflicts that spread across the African space, and just to name the most relevant ones, besides those related to Daesh, which is affirmed as a subversive phenomenon on a global scale: In North Africa the issue of Western Sahara status, conflicts in Libya, Mali and

all manifestations of instability and insecurity in the Sahel, where problems must always be seen as cross-border and interrelated; in sub-Saharan Africa we highlight all the conflict in Nigeria, both around the Niger Delta and Boko Haram, which, in addition to destabilizing northwestern Nigeria, has spread to Cameroon, Chad and Niger; and we cannot fail to mention the humanitarian disaster in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where violence is endemic and the problem of Cabindan secessionism, still unresolved in Angola, which has guerrilla purses still active in the territory.

Armed conflicts also provoke a sea of refugees who live in camps where poverty is usually high and prophylactic care is diminishing.

To all this, in Africa, there are economic disparities, climate change and exponential population growth. This culture broth arouses factors that eventually promote irregular migration, forcing people to move to other spaces in search of resources, security and well-being, weakening territories and the sense of space, "devaluing states in the logic of their constitutive elements and perhaps, valuing others; in fact, nothing new, with due adaptations" (Dias 2016).

Africa experiences all kinds of population movements, interregional and intraregional, including mixed and irregular migration, labor migration and displacement due to conflict and natural disasters. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) accounts for 16 million migrants (IOM, 2018), and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees accounts for 10 million displaced persons and seven million refugees on the Continent, about one third of the total in the world. world (UNHCR 2017).

The migratory factor (as a source of tension and some instability), with the flow oriented predominantly to the Western countries, where the new communities that settle down are hardly integrated into local societies, enhances the disenchantment and potential affiliations and combatants for the alternative presented by global subversion.

Irregular migration, which the Transnational Criminal Organizations (OCT) take advantage of, leads to the exploitation of human misery. Let us look at the dramatic situations of those who seek in the European eldorado a golden misery. In the *pateras* heading towards the northern shores of the Mediterranean or the Canaries, we meet people from all over the African continent. They come mainly from West Africa, but also from Sudan, Chad, the Horn of Africa and even Southern Africa. IOM considers three main routes: the North African route (from sub-Saharan Africa to North Africa and Europe); The Gulf of Aden route (from the Horn of Africa to Yemen and beyond); And the southern route (from the east and the horn of Africa to South Africa and beyond).

These migrants, in search of security and well-being, are at great risk

to life. Many of those who fail remain in transit countries, which become destinations. They get years old and phasing out their "jumping operation", which also allows them to have several informal jobs during the trip, which will ensure them the next step. This is a daily phenomenon, and millions of desperate people seek to reach the other side of the stability frontier, where order is still felt.

The TCBs with the funds generated acquire a level of power that competes with some of the African states. They express this power by their ability to create various forms of instability in the countries in which they operate, broad-spectrum instability from the social to the economic, from the political to the psychological. At the same time, they try to indirectly gain political power through the corruption of their sovereign bodies and their officials, in order to intimidate the established power in order to guarantee complete freedom of action in their criminal activities. This further weakens more the already weak state structures.

In West Africa, a region where most countries are among the poorest in the world, drug trafficking is valued at hundreds of millions of dollars. Narcotics trafficking networks often take advantage of structural weaknesses in countries such as Guinea-Bissau and, with the approval of local ruling elites, have turned the region into a significant transit hub for Europe's distribution route.

The 2014 West Africa Commission on Drugs report presents 2010 data showing that most of the cocaine flow from Latin America to West Africa this year crossed the Cape Verde archipelago, from where it went to the Atlantic coast of the region.

In this traffic that encompasses the porous Sahara-Sahel region, the different subversive groups maintain economic and symbiotic links with Tuareg and Berber tribes, collaborating in the trafficking of various products and, above all, in the collection of taxes on these trafficking. undocumented workers, especially in Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Ghana (Harmon 2015).

Piracy is a clear example of a threat to economic and energy security, as this criminal activity impedes the free movement of goods, including hydrocarbons. It manifests itself in the African space in two major opposing regions, but both crossed by some of the major maritime routes, but with distinctive form of action: The Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Guinea.

Its work in these places is based on the poor socioeconomic conditions of the populations and the inability of coastal states to impose their authority at sea (Silva, 2016). In the Horn of Africa 8% of world freight traffic, 40 to 50% of oil tankers, and 26% of container traffic (UNITAR/UNOSAT 2014). The alternative route through South Africa, in addition to increasing the distance, makes freight more expensive.

In the Horn of Africa, the activity is mainly based on the abduction / rescue binomial, with total activity costs estimated in 2012 from US $ 5.7 to 6.1 billion (OEFF 2013) and borne by both companies and States. In this region, international operations with military operations at sea, such as the US CTF 151 or Atalanta of the European Union, have contributed to its near disappearance.

In the Gulf of Guinea space, piracy counts 600 attacks between 2002 and 2012, severely affecting the local economy and port activities (Grevi 2016). In 2012, the Nigerian government estimated that 400,000 barrels would be stolen daily, at a total cost to the country of $ 1 billion per month (Chatham House, 2012).

It should be recalled that in the Gulf of Guinea region, oil production represents about 16% of world production. In this unstable region, almost all oil fields are located offshore, which gives them some security regarding the instability that plagues the continental area (Guedes 2012). This region also includes the Congo Basin (second largest water and forestry complex in the world after the Amazon), which covers close to two million square kilometers.

There are still other security risks in this large space, and we refer to access to natural resources. Europe's energy security is very much dependent on its southern flank. About 25% of Natural Gas and 65% of the oil that Europe imports crosses the Mediterranean. Spain imports 75% of its natural gas from Algeria, Italy imports 50% (Ose and Loup 2003); the EU increased oil imports from Africa from 18% to 23% between 2006 and 2014; in 2014 alone, Europe accounted for 45% of Nigerian and 20% of Angolan exports (Grevi, 2016), so it is imperative to guarantee freedom of movement at sea and security of supply.

Drinking water, arable land and their sharing among communities should be considered as a potential factor in regional conflicts. The most notorious cases are in South Sudan, where demand for arable land and water increases the context of instability, or between Christian farmers and Muslim nomads Fulas in Nigeria, situations that put "pressure on the land", either as a space to occupy or as a source of natural resources, including water and food, often forgotten, also classified in context as essential, respecting the criterion of need" (Dias 2016).

The manifestations of environmental change that lead to scarcity of resources and the advancement of aridity are visible in parts of Africa, leading to induced migration situations to large urban areas, further adding to food security. This situation is aggravated by the land tenure issue, and it should be noted that around 5% of African arable land is in the possession of other states and companies that bought it (Saudi Arabia, China, Brazil) (Dias 2016).

Another major threat to security in Africa comes from Pandemics

such as AIDS and Ebola, the most serious being HIV/AIDS, which is a global pandemic, with cases known on every continent. Since 1981, it has caused the deaths of approximately 25 million people, leaving 13 million children orphaned, resulting in lower deaths than any armed conflict in the twentieth century, including any of the Great Wars, and the trend is towards aggravate the situation. At the epicenter of the phenomenon we find the African continent. There are currently 36.70 million carriers of the virus, with 2.1 million new carriers in 2015 (66% in sub-Saharan Africa) and 1.1 million deaths, of which 470,000 in South and East Africa (UN 2015).

The progression of this disease is profoundly marked by its distinctive and unique character in the history of mankind, both by the extent of its spread and the death it carries with it. The progression is continuous, global, without choosing race or creed, latitude or longitude, or social condition (especially in the treatment phase). Its power of destruction extends to the whole community.

AIDS affects the state as a whole, eroding as it spreads the foundations of society, the individual, the family, and the community itself. The disease is devastating the jobs occupied by the most productive members of society. Their progress is being felt in the governmental, economic and social development areas, with the aggravation that these more productive elements of the middle and upper classes are hardly replaced.

The phenomenon also increases budget needs and social support rates, discouraging foreign investment. The workforce is thus reduced, which causes earnings to fall sharply, especially in the most debilitated or developing countries. At bottom, the impact is global and acts as a social, security and economic destabilizer.

Of the African countries with the highest incidence of AIDS, more than half are involved in armed conflict. Statistics are also clear with regard to HIV-infected military personnel being approximately 5 times higher than civilians and in times of war this figure rises to 50 times higher. The situation is so serious that often the Armed Forces (AF) are even the main group of contaminants and contaminants. This is undoubtedly a situation which in some cases is the main cause of casualties. Moreover, as AIDS does not choose posts, there are important consequences for the chains of command, the capacity of the forces and even their cohesion (Singer, 2002). The reasons for this high incidence are diverse: from reasons related to biological age, to the distancing of sexual partners and finally a risk culture installed in many AFs worldwide (Garcia 2010).

It should be noted that commands in countries where the infection rate is significant are already concerned with force projection capability. The weakening of the military institution provides mechanisms for internal dest-

abilization and weakness that increase the likelihood of an external attack. Multiplying contingents of HIV-infected military makes it impossible for many countries to participate in peace operations (Garcia 2015).

It should be noted, on the other hand, that AIDS is increasingly used as a powerful weapon of war. Kidnappings and genocides have always combined in many conflicts. However, the relevant fact is its recent association with the spread of the AIDS virus: it is possible that the transmission of AIDS may correspond to a practice of genocide, as the element of intentionality in the passage of the virus to the virus seems to be present. the population. This is what happened in Rwanda and now in Congo, where more than 500,000 women were thus infected with AIDS (Singer 2002).

Final Remarks

For the past 50 years, the continent has been the scene of persistent conflicts materialized in permanent structural violence with diverse roots, but mainly due to the fragility of states unable to guarantee their ultimate ends - security, justice and well-being.

It is this constant fragility that prevents the control of the territory and the detention of the monopoly of the use of force, which enables the emergence of other entities that seek to replace formal power, controlling populations and exercising different degrees of social responsibility over them, as are numerous. the cases in the porous Sahara-Sahel region. We refer to the Lumpen movements, or associations of an ethnolinguistic, social, security or political/popular nature, which replace or emerge, the most advanced organizational form being what we have termed global subversion.

Today global subversion materializes in the two main factions of the global jihadist movement (al-Qaeda and Daesh) seeking the conquest of spaces and power in Africa as well, using not only political mechanisms but also, where necessary, violent actions.

Its structure is complex, evolutionary, and easily adapts to different spaces and contexts, be they physical and geographical, ideological and even in cyberspace, always seeking to promote a sense of identity inclusion.

Associated or not with global subversion, the presence of the OCT and the vigorous resurgence of piracy, especially in the Gulf of Guinea region, is still evident on the Continent, jeopardizing Western economic and energy security. Economic inequities, the manifestations of climate change that lead to resource scarcity and the rise of aridity, as well as the progression of pandemics and their social and security consequences are evident and worrying,

as is the case of AIDS, and the expected exponential demographic growth, particularly in the sub-Saharan region, which eventually fosters an unprecedented westward migratory phenomenon, forcing people to move to other spaces in search of (progressively scarcer) resources, security and well-being, weakening territories, generating tensions and instability in already fragile states, in a spiral of conflict.

International intervention, if well coordinated with African states, could be more than a palliative. In fact, global threats - such as global subversion - lack a global response strategy (political/diplomatic, socioeconomic, military, psychological and electronic-informatics), which necessarily involves the creation of a network with focal points in various states for sharing and intelligence information exchange.

From this spectral analysis of the identified threats, many questions remain unanswered and several scenarios can be envisioned: which of the threats tend to increase or decrease? What are the ways in which Africa (with all its Africas) can overcome the most acute threats in the medium or long term? What is the possible answer to address them in a holistic way? How can the international community support in combating and mitigating its consequences?

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ABSTRACT

This essay begins by addressing the security context in Africa and the structural violence that is felt throughout the Continent. Later, it addresses the main threats that are manifest in such a differentiated space, emphasizing that in the current context it seems to be the fragility of the States the greatest threat, incapable of guaranteeing their inhabitants the ultimate ends - security, justice and well-being. Despite the failure of the state, people continue to live in these spaces, having various forms of social organization, which subsist and compete with other state structures, in the collection of taxes, in the use of force and also having different forms of social responsibility over the populations they control. The second threat emphasized in the essay, is one of those social structures that seek to impose itself in several geographic spaces: global subversion, which today is materialized in the two main factions of the global jihadist movement (al-Qaeda and Daesh), which seek the conquest of spaces and power also in Africa, using not only political mechanisms, but also, and when necessary, violent actions. Finally, a spectral analysis of other security threats in Africa, whether natural, such as climate change and pandemics, or man-made, such as organized crime and piracy, is presented.